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EFFLUENT NEIGHBORS: THE MEXICO-UNITED
STATES WATER QUALITY DILEMMA
When a river becomes polluted, the contamination is not
hindered by political demarcation but destroys the quality of the
entire river to the detriment of all riparians and users of the
water. The consequences of pollution have recently been recog-
nized by European' and American officials2 as well as by inter-
national tribunals3 and conferences.4  A solution for the prob-
lem, however, has not been generally agreed upon.5
The control and regulation of water quality is a major inter-
national environmental problem due to water pollution's irre-
parable nature and large scale effects. Rivers and lakes are the
primary source of water for mankind's needs and, regrettably,
they constitute only one-hundredth of one percent of the availa-
ble water on earth.6  With the increased demands that are
being put upon our dwindling water resources, quality and usage
controls must be established. The method of such quality con-
trol will have to be on the level of an entire river system's drain-
age basin, rather than on the basis of any political division.
The United States and Mexico share three international
drainage basins, the Rio Grande, Colorado, and Tijuana river
systems. The Rio Grande and Colorado basins are each divided
1. S.F. Chronicle, July 30, 1970, at 13, col. 1.
2. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47
(1970), see specifically § 4332(E).
3. See Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101 (1957);
The Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision (United States v. Canada), 33 AM. J. INT'L
L. 182 (1939), 3 INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1905 (1949).
4. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stock-
holm, June 5-16, 1972; International Conference on Water for Peace, Washing-
ton, D.C., May 23-31, 1967; Report of the Fifty-Second Conference (Helsinki
1966) of the Int'l Law Ass'n (1967); Report of the Fifty-First Conference
(Tokyo 1964) of the Int'l Law Ass'n (1965); Resolutions Adopted by the Insti-
tute of Int'l Law, Salzburg Sess., Sept. 3-12, 1961, reported in 56 AM. J. INT'L
L. 737 (1962); Seventh Pan-American Conference on the Industrial and Agricul-
tural Use of Inernational Rivers Held at Montevideo (1934).
5. THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 11 (A.H. Garretson, R.D.
Hayton, C.J. Olmstead ed. 1967).
6. Id. at 5.
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into an upper and lower section. The three basins cover nearly
all of the 1,950 miles of boundary line between the two coun-
tries7 and collectively serve as the sole water supply for the en-
tire Mexican-United States border population.' As of yet, there
has been little bi-national cooperation in establishing water qual-
ity control in these river systems. The only current agreement
providing water quality regulation for the three basins on an in-
ternational scale is the Treaty of 1944' which, it shall be shown
in this Comment, is inadequate at best.
Recognizing the contemporary problems of international
water quality control, this Comment will consider the concepts
and principles of international law as they apply to drainage
basins. The discussion will then turn to the provisions that the
United States and Mexico have made concerning water quality
control of the three international drainage basins. A proposed
solution to the Mexican-United States water quality dilemma will
then be submitted.
I. THE CONCEPT OF POLLUTION
A definition of pollution within the context of international
law must be established before pollution control can be dis-
cussed. Essentially, pollution lowers the quality or corrupts the
natural state of the medium that it enters. The subjective concept of
quality makes any definition of pollution difficult to grasp."°
The pollution concept as it involves water quality, has been
couched in various terms." In international disputes, the pollu-
7. D.H. JORDAN & J. FRIEDKIN, THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER
COMMISSION, U.S. AND MEXICO part I, paper submitted by the Commissioners
of the International Boundary and Water Commission to the Int'l Conference on
Water for Peace, Washington, D.C., May 23-31, 1967.
8. id. at part I.
9. Treaty with Mexico on Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and
Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994
(1945) [hereinafter cited as Treaty of 1944].
10. It has been recognized that environmental indicators, much like price
indexes that indicate societal values, should be established to determine what
level of environmental quality is desired by the general public. With such find-
ings, the appropriate quality standards could be ascertained. See 42 U.S.C. §
4332(B) (1970); J. BRECHER & M. NESTLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK
3-49 (1970); U.S. DEPT. OF H.E.W., TOWARD A SOCIAL REPORT passim (1969).
11. For example, the Refuse Act of 1899 prohibits any discharge into navi-
gable waters that would impede navigation. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970). Water
quality has been protected by prohibiting certain kinds of uses as in the Lake
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1972], Art. 18
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol3/iss1/18
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
tion of a river has been discussed in relation to its effect on the
use of the waters by riparians. The pollution regulated by inter-
national law is generally that which is the result of an injurious
use. The use may cause either a substantial injury to a cori-
parian" or result in a material alteration of the river waters to
the extent that they may no longer be utilized beneficially."
Thus, by diminishing quality, pollution of water by a non-con-
sumptive use may have the same effect as that resulting from a
consumptive use of the water. 4  Traditionally, the rights of
coriparians to use an international stream included the right to
pollute provided that the polluting use would not harm a cori-
parian or his use of the waters. A few current domestic laws
have broken with tradition by characterizing pollution as an al-
teration of the nature of the water itself rather than as a use.
Such laws as the Mexican Federal Anti-Contamination Law' and
the United States Federal Water Quality Improvement Act of
197016 reflect this new attitude that liability is not based on
harm to the riparian but rather on harm to the water.
Lanous Arbitration; for a general discussion of the case, see Laylin & Bianchi,
The Role of Adjudication in International River Disputes: The Lake Lanoux Case,
53 Am. J. INT'L L. 30 (1959). For water quality control by prohibiting uses,
see also Griffin, The Use of Waters of International Drainage Basins Under Cus-
tomary International Law, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 50 (1959); Shapiro-Libai, Devel-
opment of International River Basins: Regulation of Riparian Competition, Part
1, 45 IND. L. J. 20 (1969). Recently, water quality has been protected by legis-
lation prohibiting any act that may change or lower the quality of the water ei-
ther directly or indirectly, and not necessarily in terms of use of the water. See
Federal Law for the Prevention and Control of Contamination of the Environ-
ment, art. 4, D.O., Mar. 23, 1971 [hereinafter cited as MEXICAN ANTI-CON-
TAMINATION LAW]; Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-
75 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WQIA].
12. See, e.g., Lake Lanoux Arbitration, 24 I.L.R. 101 (1957); INT'L LAW
AsS'N, HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS
art. X (1967) [hereinafter cited as HELSINKI RULES]; also to be found with
I.L.A. comments in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra note
5, at 780.
13. See, e.g., The Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182
(1939), 3 INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1905 (1949); Van Alstyne, The Justiciability of
International River Disputes: A Study in the Case Method, 1964 DUKE L.J. 307,
314.
14. THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra note 5, at 11, 17.
15. In Article 3 of the Mexican Anti-Contamination Law, D.O., Mar. 23,
1971, what is proposed to be controlled are "contaminants . . . which directly
or indirectly are capable of producing contamination or degradation of ecological
systems."
16. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970).
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II. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF CORIPARIANS IN AN
INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASIN
A. The Basin Approach
To aid in the analysis, a foundation must be established
upon which to apply the international principles of coriparian
rights. Some authorities feel that the drainage basin approach is
the strongest, 7 while others have determined that such an ap-
proach is no longer realistic.' The Helsinki Conference of the
International Law Association in 1967, defined an international
drainage basin as, "a geographical area extending over two or
more states determined by the watershed limits of the system of
waters, including surface and underground waters, flowing into
a common terminus."'
19
A few authorities consider the determination of rights and
obligations of coriparians on a strictly geographical basis unreal-
istic.2" They maintain that such human factors as technology,
economics, and politics play overpowering roles in determining
the uses allowable in a given river system.2 ' However, it is sub-
mitted that the more realistic and just determination of rights and
obligations in a drainage basin is founded upon geographical fac-
tors. As the Helsinki Rules point out, to attain the most effi-
cient use of international waters, the entire basin must be con-
sidered regardless of "human realities."22  Water pollution and
the environment are not restricted by political boundaries or
other human variables; therefore, the primary consideration in
17. Report of the Fifty-Second Conference (Helsinki 1966) of the Int'l
Law Ass'n 484-5 (1967); Shapiro-Libai, supra note I1, at 23; and see H.A.
SMITH, THE ECONOMIC USE OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS (1931). For a listing of
other authorities supporting the unity of a river basin principle, see Bourne, The
Development of International Resources: The "Drainage Basin Approach", 47
CAN. B. REV. 62, 63 n.3 (1969).
18. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 298 U.S. 573 (1945); Lake Lanoux Arbitration,
24 I.L.R. 101, 124-5 (1957); S. REP. No. 25, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967);
Bourne, supra note 17, at 71.
19. HELSINKI RULES, supra note 12, art. II; for authority citing the Helsinki
definition, as generally accepted, see THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE
BASINS, supra note 5, at 4.
20. See, e.g., note 18 supra.
21. In support of this view the tribunal in the Lake Lanoux Arbitration
points out, ". . . the unity of a basin is sanctioned at the juridical level only
to the extent that it corresponds to human reality." Lake Lanoux Arbitration, 24
I.L.R. 101, 125 (1957).
22. HELSINKI RULES, supra note 12, arts. II, V; and see, e.g., note 17 supra.
4
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1972], Art. 18
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol3/iss1/18
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
the formulation of effective water usage laws must be geographi-
cal factors. The injury involved in pollution of a water supply
will initially affect those within the basin. Thus, limitation by
political demarcation of the area to which water usage principles
may apply is both economically and environmentally unrealistic.
The human realities point of view is a valid position in that such
human variables as technology must be considered.23 The over-
all effect of human and natural realities, however, is most
strongly felt within the basin as a geographical area.24 It is logi-
cal, then, to evaluate the human factors only after the natural
realities of the basin as a unit have been considered.
B. The Principle to be Applied
Having established that effective international principles re-
garding water usage must be applied on a drainage basin level,
a determination of the principles themselves must follow. Some
writers deny the existence of a body of international legal prin-
ciples upon which a tribunal may base its findings in a dispute
involving an international drainage basin. 25  Others have ascer-
tained that specific principles are applicable and that one concept
has become predominant.26
Jerome Lipper, in The Law of International Drainage Bas-
ins, cites four basic legal concepts concerning the use of interna-
tional drainage basins.27 All of the principles are based on vary-
23. Bourne, supra note 17, at 71-83. For discussions of the technological
aspects of inter-basin transfers of water, see Hearings on H.R. 4671 and Similar
Bills Before the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the House Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 89-17, pt. 2
(1966).
24. See, e.g., International Commission of the River Oder Case, [1929]
P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 23 at 27; HELSINKI RULES, supra note 12, art. V; Resolu-
tions Adopted by the Institute of Int'l Law, Salzburg Sess., Sept. 3-12, 1961, art.
2, reported in 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 737 (1962); J. BRECHER & M. NESTLE, supra
note 10, at 3-11; H. SMITH, Tim ECONOMIC USE OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 150
(1931); Roberts, River Basin Authorities: A National Solution to Water Pollu-
tion, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1527, 1544 (1970); Shapiro-Libai, Development of Inter-
national River Basins: Regulation of Riparian Competition, Part 11, 45 IND. L. J.
195, 252 (1970).
25. See F. BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 (1959); Smith,
The Waters of the Jordan: A Problem of International Water Control, 25 INT'L
AFF. 415, 420 (1949); Shapiro-Libai, supra note 24, at 249.
26. TiE LAw OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra note 5, at 17.
For citations to authorities supporting the principle of equitable utilization, see
Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 337 n.1l0.
27. The four concepts are: (1) Territorial integrity, (2) Absolute territorial
sovereignty, (3) Community of coriparian states in the waters of an interna-
Vol. 3
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ing degrees of sovereignty which limit the rights of another na-
tion to share the water as a resource. The principle under which
the highest degree of sovereignty is maintained extends a right to
the riparian to use waters to any extent but denies him the right
to demand flow from upstream.2" This principle was embraced
by the Harmon Doctrine, 9 which has been used by both Mexico
and the United States since 1895 to impede the rights of the
other in use of the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers.3 0 However,
such a doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty in the use of
international waters has been all but abandoned. 3
The current weight of authority apparently considers lim-
ited sovereignty (equitable utilization) the predominant use doc-
trine with respect to both contiguous and successive international
rivers.32 The principle has found support in the holdings of the
Lake Lanoux Arbitration,3 3 Trail Smelter Arbitration,3 4 and In-
ternational Commission of the River Oder Case."5 Several writ-
ers have upheld its applicability36 and numerous international
conventions have endorsed its use.
37
The overriding objective of the equitable utilization princi-
ple is to determine water usage rights that provide for the maxi-
tional river and (4) Limited territorial sovereignty. THE LAW OF INTERNA-
TIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra note 5, at 18.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 20. For a brief historical sketch of the Harmon Doctrine, see
N. HUNDLEY, DIVIDING THE WATERS 23 (1966).
30. Convention Between the United States and Mexico, May 21, 1906, 34
Stat. 2953, T.S. No. 455 (1907); Treaty of 1944, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S.
No. 994 (1945); N. HUNDLEY, supra note 29, at 39-40, 63-4; Press Release,
U.S. Dep't of State, Dec. 21, 1961; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Int., Dec. 19,
1961, Jan. 24, 1962. The Treaty of 1944 is cited here because the U.S. main-
tains that the Treaty was negotiated and completed on the basis of comity and
acknowledges no legal claims of Mexico.
31. Testimony of B.M. English, Ass't Legal Advisor of the Dept. of State
in Hearings Before Committee on Foreign Relations on Treaty With Mexico Re-
lating to Utilization of Waters of Certain Rivers, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., at 175
(1945) [hereinafter cited as Treaty Hearings]; THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
DRAINAGE BASINS, supra note 5, at 35, 76 n.89, and 96.
32. THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra note 5, at 63, 94;
and, see note 26 supra. The equitable utilization principle has historically been
known by the maxim: sic utere tuo ut non alienum laedus.
33. 24 I.L.R. 101 (1957).
34. 33 Am. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939), 3 INT'L ARB. AwARDs 1905 (1949).
35. International Commission of the River Oder Case, [1929] P.C.I.J., ser.
A, No. 23 at 27.
36. Supra note 26.
37. See, e.g., note 4 supra.
1972
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mum benefit and minimum detriment to each riparian in an in-
ternational drainage basin.38  Such a determination requires anal-
ysis of specific factors. Each riparian's need, based on social
and economic factors, is the basic element of the principle.89
Authorites differ as to the influence prior appropriation and ex-
isting use should have on the determination of riparian rights.
It is apparent, however, that both elements have no more conse-
quence than any other "relevant and pertinent circumstances"
used to determine an equitable utilization of river waters.40
To analyze a pollution problem in terms of equitable utiliza-
tion it is necessary to evaluate any water usage causing substan-
tial injury to a coriparian's use of river water in light of all the
riparians' needs. Such needs must be determined by social and
economic factors, the riparians' prior appropriations, existing
uses, and any other relevant circumstances. A coriparian's harm-
ful use of the water will have to be restricted if the need of an
injured riparian outweighs the coriparian's need of the harmful
(polluting) use. Such restrictions would allow water usage for
the maximum benefit and to the minimum detriment of all ri-
parians.
C. Application of the Equitable Utilization Principle
The principle of equitable utilization may be applied on
either an administrative or an adjudicative level. The level on
which water quality control would be most effective is questiona-
ble.
Adjudication of an international river dispute is the last in-
stitutional step in solving a water quality problem. Some writ-
ers feel that tribunals lack the expertise to solve highly technical
water disputes."' Additionally, to obtain an adjudicative deter-
mination of a water usage dispute, an injury must have oc-
curred. 42  Considering the objective of water quality control and
the lasting nature of pollution in a stream, this after the fact
38. THE LAw OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra note 5, at 48;
see Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907).
39. See, e.g., HELSINKI RULES, supra note 12, art. V; Resolutions Adopted
by the Institute of Int'l Law, Salzburg Sess., supra note 4, art. 3; Shapiro-Libai,
supra note 11, at 63.
40. THE LAw OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra note 5, at 39, 64-5.
41. Id. at 109; Shapiro-Libai, supra note 24, at 214.
42. THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra note 5, at 102, 109,
Vol. 3
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method is self defeating. The use of injunctive relief by a
tribunal, however, would prohibit a harmful use by one riparian
prior to any detrimental effect that may be suffered by a cori-
parian." The possibility of the controversy evolving into a ques-
tion of rights based on legal principles must also be recognized,
and a tribunal of last resort in that case would assert the most
influence." The agreement to use a third party to settle water
disputes has one other benefit; it tends to induce reconciliation
when a problem arises and provides for more understanding in
negotiating sessions.45
The most effective means of promulgating regulations for in-
ternational drainage basin water quality would be on the admin-
istrative level. As the Helsinki Rules point out, future uses of
an international drainage basin can be determined by joint agen-
cies which have surveyed the basin and can "formulate plans or
recommendations for the fullest and most efficient use thereof
in the interests of all basin states."4 6  Future uses can be con-
sidered at the adminstrative level in determining development of
the basin, based on equitable utilization; while at the judicial
level the principle prohibits such consideration.
47
43. See Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939),
3 INT'L ARB. AwARDS 1905 (1949); THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE
BASINS, supra note 5, at 114.
44. See Treaty with Great Britain, Jan. 11, 1909, art. X, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S.
No. 548 (1910); HELSINKI RULES, supra note 12, art. XXXIV.
45. Laylin & Bianchi, supra note 11, at 34.
In a Dep't of State memorandum drawn up by W.L. Griffin in 1958, the use
of a third party to settle international river disputes was developed. He main-
tained that if a riparian, in good faith, objected to a coriparian's use and
agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration of judicial settlement as provided for in
Article 33(1) of the Charter of the United Nations, then the coriparian "is un-
der a duty to refrain from making, or allowing, such change in the existing re-
gime of a system of international waters, pending agreement or other solution."
W. GRIFFIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE USE OF SYSTEMS OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS,
S. Doc. No. 118, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 90-91 (1958).
46. HELSINKI RULES, supra note 12, art. XXXI; and, see H.A. SMITH, supra
note 17; Int'l Law Ass'n Committee on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers,
Report Submitted to the Fifty-First Conference (Tokyo 1964) of the Int'l Law
Ass'n at 31 (1965).
47. See Arizona v. California, Special Master's Report, at 321, filed Jan.
16, 1961, 364 U.S. 940; Arizona v. California, 283 U.S 423, 463-64 (1931).
When considering unreasonableness- of protecting future uses it must be re-
membered that, ". . . there might be changes in the volume of available water,
the needs of riparians, the nature of the uses, or advances in technology, all
before the future use comes into being." THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE
BASINS, supra note 5, at 59.
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The effective application of equitable utilization, therefore,
must be accomplished by an intergovernmental commision oper-
ating on both the administrative and judicial levels. Such a com-
mission would provide for both development of the basin and
adjustment of riparian conflicts based on the principle. 8 How-
ever, to provide for such a commission, each country would have
to relinquish some sovereignty over that portion of the basin lying
within its territorial boundaries. This prospect would seem to be
repulsive to most sovereigns. Preservation of sovereignty and
denial of the equitable utilization principle might be justified if
a riparian country were never affected by coriparian pollution.
Few nations, however, occupy such an advantageous position.
States that share international drainage basins can be either lower
riparians or neighbors on contiguous rivers and be susceptible to
coriparian pollution. Thus, in order to avoid inconsistency and
international embarrassment, a country, sharing an international
drainage basin and claiming applicability of the equitable utiliza-
tion principle when its water usage rights are infringed upon by
a coriparian, will have to abide by the principle when a claim is
levied against it for violation of riparian rights.4 9
Il. MEXICAN-UNITED STATES WATER QUALITY PROVISIONS
A. 1944 Utilization of Waters Treaty-
United States and Mexico
The early development of nationalistic principles governing
the use of the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers can be attributed
to the lack of any comprehensive international water laws during
the late 1800's.50 The respective official positions taken by the
United States and Mexico concerning their water rights in the
border area were obviously influenced by the climate and the
territorial control of the upper Rio Grande and Colorado river
48. See THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra note 5, at 110;
Shapiro-Libai, supra note 25, at 252.
49. For example, the U.S., as upper riparian, has ignored the application of
the equitable utilization principle to Mexico's water rights as indicated in the
1906 and 1944 treaties, but as lower riparian to Canada, the U.S. has sup-
ported the principle's application to its own water rights in the Columbia River
controversy. Delineation of the respective U.S. and Canadian views on the
Columbia River controversy may be found in Johnson, The Canada-United States
Controversy over the Columbia River, 41 WASH. L. REv. 676 (1966).
50. N. HUNDLEY, supra note 29, at 18; THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
DRAINAGE BASINS, supra note 5, at 22, 94.
Vol. 3
9
Johnston: Effluent Neighbors: The Mexico-United States Water Quality Dilemm
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1972
EFFLUENT NEIGHBORS
basins by the United States. Thus, until 1913, the Mexicans
based their claim on the doctrine of prior appropriation due to
their heritage in the area, while the United States considered the
Harmon Doctrine the controlling mandate.' In 1906 the United
States and Mexico drafted a convention allocating the upper Rio
Grande waters based on existing uses. 2 The United States main-
tained that the Convention had no effect on water rights between
the two nations since it was founded upon comity.53 From 1913
to the early 1920's the internal strife of Mexico allowed the
United States to control the development of the Colorado basin.54
The Mexican development of uses in the Mexicali Valley during
the late 1920's and 1930's prompted the Colorado Basin Con-
ference of 1938, which represented an attempt by the Colorado
basin states to determine some fixed allocation of the river waters
before Mexico developed further uses.5 Such factors as the bas-
in states pressing for a fixed allocation, the Texans calling for a
treaty to protect their rights to the lower Rio Grande waters,"a
the need to maintain harmonious hemispheric relations due to
developments in Europe, 57 and the desire of the Mexicans for a
guaranteed portion of the Colorado River waters, 8 forced the
creation of the Treaty of 1944. The Treaty is based on then
existing uses and provides for an International Boundary and
Water Commission, flood control and water conservation works
to be built on the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers, and specific
annual allocations of waters, the extent of which determine each
country's rights to use of the waters. 59
The use of each river basin is individually provided for in
the Treaty. It is significant that in article 16, which deals with
the development of a distribution plan for the Tijuana River
51. N. HUNDLEY, supra note 29, at 40. It is interesting to note that the
argument used by Mexico concerning the lower Rio Grande was based on the Har-
mon Doctrine, as most of the tributaries to that section of the river were in
Mexico. Mexico later used its control of the lower Rio Grande to push U.S.
recognition of Mexican rights to Colorado River water. Id. at 40, 94.
52. Convention Between the United States and Mexico, May 21, 1906, 34
Stat. 2953, T.S. No. 455 (1907).
53. Id.; N. HUNDLEY, supra note 29, at 66.
54. N. HUNDLEY, supra note 29, at 54.
55. Id. at 87.
56. Id. at 94.
57. Id. at 100.
58. S. Doc. No. 98, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., at 17 (1945); El Universal
(Mexico, D.F.), Aug. 1, 1945.
59. Treaty of 1944, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994 (1945).
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waters, the essence of equitable utilization is apparent. As a
possible explanation, the protection of existing uses might have
been eased in the article due to the fact that the United States is a
lower riparian on the Tijuana River and, at the time of the
Treaty negotiation, no influential existing uses were established
on either side of the border. The provisions determining the
rights of each country to Rio Grande waters (a contiguous riv-
er)60 are more specific as existing uses were established at the
time of the treaty negotiations. In article 9, relating to Rio
Grande water utilization, the concept of noninjurious use of river
water appears.6 ' When the provisions for the use of the Colo-
rado River were established, no provisions for distribution based
on need, or for prevention of harmful utilization of the waters by
a coriparian were made.62 Thus, as the United States territorial
dominance of each international river grew, so did its water usage
rights under the Treaty. After such an appraisal, the veiled
presence of the Harmon Doctrine in the Treaty of 1944 becomes
apparent.
One of the major reasons for the United States Senate's
ratification of the Treaty was its fear of arbitration under the
1929 Inter-American Arbitration Agreement. Due to the recog-
nition of equitable utilization instead of the Harmon Doctrine,
larger allocations of water for Mexico's use would have been the
probable result of an arbitral award.63 Mexico, on the other
hand, would not have ratified the Treaty had it realized how
the United States was going to interpret the words "from any
and all sources" 64 or "wherever these waters may arise in the bed
of the limitrophe section of the Colorado River"6 5 in terms of
water quality. These words were chosen to allow United States
credit for return flow in calculating water delivery of Colorado
River waters to Mexico. 66
The United States has taken the position that the Treaty
never provided for the quality of the water to be delivered to
60. Id. art. 4.
61. Id. art. 9.
62. Id. art. 10.
63. Laylin & Bianchi, supra note 11, at 39-41.
64. Treaty of 1944, Feb. 3, 1944, art. 10, 59 Stat. 1219 T.S. No. 994
(1945).
65. Id. art. 11.
66. S. Doc. No. 98, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., at 17 (1945).
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Mexico. 7 The negotiators of the Treaty for Mexico were under
the impression that the waters delivered to Mexico would be use-
able based on the uses delineated in article 3 of the Treaty.6
8
As the Mexican Foreign Ministry stated:
The Treaty, according to its text and spirit was concluded
to arrive at the distribution, for beneficial uses, of inter-
national waters, among which the agricultural one is out-
standing, which excludes definitively the possibility that wa-
ters of bad quality may be delivered to us. 9
Superficially, the Treaty of 1944 was based on existing use
and comity while its substance indirectly maintained application
of the Harmon Doctrine. The Treaty in its contemporary appli-
cation, therefore, is economically, socially, and environmentally
inadequate, as well as violative of the equitable utilization prin-
ciple of international water usage law.
The provisions for water quality control established under
the auspices of the 1944 Treaty must be analyzed to fully under-
stand the water quality dilemma involving the U.S. and Mexico.
It is important to realize that the Treaty is the only existing ve-
hicle through which either country may take any effective inter-
national action to regulate the quality of the Rio Grande, Colo-
rado, or Tijuana rivers. All other water quality provisions af-
fecting the international waters are promulgated and enforced on
a domestic level thereby allowing the establishment of conflicting
67. 3 WMTEMAN, DIGEST OF INT'L LAw 962-64 (1964); Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of State, Dec. 21, 1961; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Int., Dec. 19, 1961,
Jan. 24, 1962; Treaty Hearings, Tipton testimony, supra note 31, at 230.
68. The uses of the water are listed in order of preference:
1. Domestic and municipal uses.
2. Agriculture and stock-raising.
3. Electric power.
4. Other industrial uses.
5. Navigation.
6. Fishing and hunting.
7. Any other beneficial uses which may be determined by the Comis-
sion.
All the foregoing uses shall be subject to any sanitary measures or
works which may be mutually agreed upon by the two governments,
which hereby agree to give preferential attention to the solution of all
border sanitation problems.
Treaty of 1944, Feb. 3, 1944, art. 3, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994 (1945); and,
see Adolfo Orive Alba's testimony in front of the Mexican Senate as printed in
the Mexico City newspaper El Universal, Aug. 1, 1945, translation thereof in S.
Doc. No. 98, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., at 16-17 (1945).
69. SECRETARIA DE RELACIONES EXTERIoREs, EL TRATADO DE AGUAS IN-
TERNACIONALES CELEBRADO ENTRE MEXICO Y Los EsTADOs UNIDos EL 3 DE
FEBRERO DE 1944, OFICINA DE LIMITES Y AGUAS INTERNACIONALES, at 81 (1947).
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standards, as well as economic and administrative inefficiencies
which result in a lack of effective pollution control. The Treaty
simply provides for the International Boundary and Water Com-
mission (IBWC) to consider sanitary measures mutually agreed
upon by the two governments." ° Article 3 of the Treaty indicates
that the two governments will give "preferential attention to the
solution of all border sanitation problems."'" Such nebulous pro-
visions, combined with the delivery statements of articles 10 and 11,
indicate the limited scope of this archaic utilization treaty. Its
provisions deal ineffectively with the quality regulation of the water
to be shared by the two countries, thereby proximately ignoring the
water's use.72 As pointed out earlier, while pollution may not be a
use itself, it can diminish and ultimately stop the use of a river.
Such "consumptive use" of the river by pollution is not considered
by the Treaty.
71
The International Boundary and Water Commission is the
only intergovernmental agency involved with water quality con-
trol of the Rio Grande, Colorado, and Tijuana rivers. The Com-
mission consists of two sections, one from each country, the head
of each section being an "Engineer Commissioner. ' 74  As indi-
cated by the Treaty, the basic concern of this bi-national agency
involves the construction of flood control, water and sewage
treatment works.75 The Commission's function, in many respects,
appears to be that of an international Army Corps of Engineers.
The Commission has determined its functions as being
limited to acts needed for coordination of the two Govern-
ments plans for works along the boundary to safeguard
their respective rights, and to enable each to obtain benefits
that could not be achieved by unilateral action. The purpose
of this general principle is to protect each Government's
sovereignty and freedom of action in the utilization of waters,
both of its basins draining into the international rivers and
those from the mainstreams allocated to it by treaties.7 6
This statement summarizes the effect the Commission has on the
control of water quality in the international rivers. In its analy-
70. Treaty of 1944, Feb. 3, 1944, art. 3, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994
(1945).
71. Id.
72. Id. arts. 20, 23, 24.
73. Id. art. I(j).
74. Id. art. 2.
75. Id. arts. 5, 6, 7; D.H. JORDAN & J. FRIEDKIN, supra note 7, parts III, IV.
76. D.H. JORDAN & J. FRIEDKIN, supra note 7, part I.
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sis and approach to problems the agency follows the equitable
utilization principle." However, the actual implementation and
impact of its projects are limited by the protection of sovereign
interests perpetuated by the 1944 Treaty.7" Article 2 and sub-
section (d) of article 24 exemplify the maintenance of sovereign
interests by providing that agreements or settlement of disputes
between the two countries by the Commission are subject to the
approval of the two governments.
79
B. Domestic Water Quality Provisions
1. United States.-There are essentially three federal
statutes now in force in the United States which influence the
water quality of the Rio Grande, Colorado, and Tijuana rivers.
The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 (WQIA) s° and
the Refuse Act of 18991 deal with water quality specifically,
while the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)8 2 indi-
rectly influences water quality through regulation of federal agen-
cies.
Section 1151 (a) of the WQIA gives one reason for the
Act's existence, that being "to enhance the quality and value of
our water resources and to establish a national policy for the pre-
vention, control, and abatement of water pollution. 8 3  The Act,
in essence, provides for the establishment of individual state wa-
ter quality standards applicable to interstate waters flowing
through or bordering the state. 4 The standards are generally
77. Id. parts II, V.
78. See, e.g., Treaty of 1944, Feb. 3, 1944, arts. 5, 10, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S.
No. 994 (1945).
79. Id. arts. 2, 24(d); see also San Lorenzo Title and Improvement Co. v.
City Mortgage Co., Tex. Civ. App., 48 S.W.2d 310 (1932), and San Lorenzo Ti-
tle and Improvement Co. v. Clardy, Tex. Civ. App., 48 S.W.2d 315 (1932), in
which the courts defined the IBWC as having the power to make only finding of
fact; and note the opinion of counsel for the U.S. Section of the IBWC in 1957:
"'there is no power conferred by treaty upon either of its IBWC Sec-
tions or upon the joint Commission to determine relative or correlative
rights as between claimants in the respective countries to the alloca-
tions of water between the two countries made by treaty. Such pow-
ers could not be conferred except to a judicial tribunal, which the
Commission is not.'"
3 WHITEMAN, supra note 67, at 977.
80. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970).
81. Id. § 407.
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
83. 33 U.S.C. § l151(a) (1970).
84. Id. § 1160.
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intended to protect health and welfare, enhance the quality of
the water, and preserve the water's use for public water supplies,
propagation of wildlife, recreational, industrial, agricultural, and
other legitimate purposes.11
Section 1160 (d) (2) of WQIA provides for enforcement mea-
sures against pollution when an international claim is pressed.
Under this section, an international agency (i.e. IBWC) must
submit any claim to the Secretary of the Interior who determines
if the pollution "endangers the health and welfare of persons in
a foreign country." He may not, however, begin proceedings
until the Secretary of State requests that such pollution be abated.
If the Secretary of the Interior feels the harm is substantial, a
conference is convened. The country that is adversely affected
by the pollution is given the advisory status, during the confer-
ence, of a state water pollution control agency. 8 If, after the
conference is held, abatement is not forthcoming, then a public
hearing may follow, 7 and eventually a federal court may hear
the case.8
The Refuse Act of 1899 prohibits any discharge by an on
shore facility of refuse matter other than rain and natural runoff
from streets and sewers into any navigable waters or tributaries
thereof in the United States.89  The responsibility for prosecution
when a provision of the Act is violated is upon the United States
Attorney's Office, when requested to do so by the proper author-
ity. 90 A guilty offender is subject to a fine of $500 to $2,500
for each offense.91 Section 407 requires anyone wishing to dis-
charge wastes directly into navigable waters of the United States
to obtain a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers.
The major provision of the National Environmental Policy
Act is found in Section 4332.92 This Section requires that an
85. Id. §§ 1153(c)(2), 1160(,c)(3).
86. The right of a foreign country to bring the proceedings against a pol-
luter in the U.S., it should be noted, is reciprocal under 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (1970).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1160(d)(2) (1970).
88. Id. § 1160(g).
The courts, in determining the outcome of the alleged violation, are or-
dered by the statute to give "due consideration to the practicability, and to the
physical and economic feasibility of complying with the standards.... .. 33
U.S.C. § 1160(c)(5) (1970).
89. Id. § 407.
90. Id. § 413.
91. Id. § 411.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-47 (1970).
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environmental impact statement be attached to any proposal for
federal legislation or action by a federal agency, such as the U.S.
Section of the IBWC, which might have a significant effect on
the environment.
Although these domestic provisions for water quality may
be comprehensive, any significant international application is
questionable. The WQIA is presently subject to application by
the individual states and is dependent upon state action and fund-
ing. It is apparent, however, that reliance on state programs is
insufficient and that the federal government must establish stand-
ards and utilize its own funds if there is to be a viable interna-
national drainage basin water quality program.93 The WQIA en-
forcement procedure is exceedingly long and involved, as well
as having force only after the harm has been done. The harm
itself must be drastic, and the sanctions of the Act do nothing to
protect a foreign country's beneficial utilization of river waters.
Domestically, the Refuse Act has been inadequately enforced and
used only as a supplement to the WQIA.94 The guidelines for
what must be included in an environmental impact statement un-
der the NEPA are still vague. Furthermore, although threats to
water quality may be pointed out by the environmental impact
statements, no effective device is provided in the Act to prohibit
the probable threats to the environment. The impact statement
merely serves as a medium through which environmentalists and
qualified governmental agencies may convey their opinions of
proposed governmental projects in light of environmental con-
siderations.
2. Mexico.-The predominant federal law of Mexico in-
fluencing the water quality of the Rio Grande, Colorado, and
Tijuana rivers is entitled "Federal Law for the Prevention and
93. See C.E.Q., ANN. REP. 44 (1970); J. BRECHER & M. NESTLE, supra
note 10, at 56; Long, New Tasks for All Levels of Government, ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY IN A GROWING ECONOMY 145 (Jarrett ed. 1966); and note statement
by W. Ruckelshaus, administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
[EPA], looking for a future merging of state and federal water quality control
programs. BNA, ENVIRON. REP., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS (July 2, 1971) at
253.
94. See J. BRECHER & M. NESTLE, supra note 10, at 227-8; and statement
by J.R. Quales, Jr., EPA assistant administrator for enforcement, pointing out
the overlap between the standards established under WQIA and the Refuse Act of
1899 thereby making the enforcement of the older act and its permit program ex-
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Control of Contamination of the Environment." 5  The Law was
put in force on March 23, 1971, and its provisions are more
stringent than any current domestic pollution legislation in the
United States.
Article 1 sets out the legislative purpose, that being to im-
prove, conserve, and restore the environment. Generally, the
Law prohibits any contamination which would "prejudice or dis-
turb the life, health and well-being of man, flora and fauna, or
which degrades the quality of the air, water and soil, or property
of the resources of the nation in general or of individuals."9
Application is based on the Federal Executive power which, in
article 9, distinctly refers to the effective application of the vari-
ous provisions.
Chapter Three of the Law specifically deals with water qual-
ity control. Within Chapter Three, article 14 provides for federal
quality standards applicable to discharges into river basins and
other bodies of water. Article 16 provides that works under
construction or those in operation will be interdicted if the dis-
charge of waste waters "might cause contamination." Determi-
nation of interdiction is to be made by the Secretariat of Hy-
draulic Resources and Secretariat of Health and Assistance. Arti-
cle 17 establishes a permit system in which all applications to
discharge waste waters into waters belonging to the nation are
to be ruled upon by the Secretariat of Hydraulic Resources in
concord with the Secretariat of Health and Assistance, "imposing
in each case the conditions which are deemed to be necessary."
Under article 20, the Secretariat of Hydraulic Resources is em-
powered to supervise any project that may cause contamination
of waters; when deemed necessary by the Secretariat, the equiva-
lent of an environmental impact statement may be required.
Sanctions in Chapter Five range from fines of 50 to 100,000
pesos ($44 to $8,000) to "[t]emporary or definite closure of
factories or establishments which produce or emit contaminants
and fines. . . ."' From article 32 it may be deduced that only
the appropriate authority, that is, the Secretariat of Hydraulic
Resources, may take action to regulate pollution and impose the
sanctions provided in Chapter Five.
95. Mexican Anti-Contamination Law, D.O., Mar. 23, 1971.
96. Id. art. 4(b).
97. Id. art. 29.
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Some problems become evident after analyzing the Mexican
Anti-Contamination Law. Will Mexico, as a developing country,
restrict industrialization and development where contamination
will result? Realistically, the short range objective of increased
productivity will more than likely take precedence over farsight-
ed and relatively intangible environmental considerations. Does
not the total control of water quality vested in the Secretariats of
Hydraulic Resources and Health and Assistance centralize exces-
sive power with no checks or balances? On an international
scale, what provisions are there for claims of damages sustained
by another country or its citizens due to contamination traceable
to an entity in Mexico? Finally, the Law itself is representative
of an ideal, and as such is admirable. Implementation and en-
forcement of the Law, however, will be the true test of the Mexi-
can Government's desire to establish a quality environment and,
more specifically, to improve the quality of the water it shares
with the United States.
IV. PRESENT STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL WATER
QUALITY PROVISIONS AND PROBLEMS
In a recent joint communique, United States President Nixon
and Mexican President Echeverria expressed their concern over the
Colorado River salinity and dedicated themselves to finding a
definitive solution for the problem at the earliest possible time. 8
However, an effective solution to the water quality problem as it
exists between the United States and Mexico is not foreseeable un-
der present conditions. The present United States position that
there is no provision in the Treaty of 1944 regulating the quality of
the waters delivered to Mexico and that Mexico does not have an
international right to obtain usable water from the Colorado River
demonstrates the problem. 99 Conversely, Mexico is steadfastly
98. Joint Communique, President Richard Nixon and President Luis Eche-
verria, Washington, D.C., June 16, 1972. The Communique also included
a four point proposal by President Nixon as follows: (1) undertake actions
immediately to improve the quality of water going to Mexico; (2) designate
a special representative to begin work immediately to find a solution to the prob-
lem; (3) instruct the special representative to submit a report by the end of
1972, and; (4) submit the special representative's findings and solutions, once
the U.S. Government has approved them, to President Echeverria for his consid-
eration and approval. Minute No. 241 has implimented these measures.
99. See IBWC, Minute No. 218, Mar. 22, 1965, Recommendation 11,
T.I.A.S. 6988; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Nov. 15, 1971 [extending for
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demanding a water quality level based on its interpretation of the
intent of the 1944 Treaty.' The quality standard expected by
Mexico, however, is becoming more difficult to reach with con-
tinued development of the United States portion of the Colorado
River basin. The canals constructed to drain the Morillo and Well-
ton-Mohawk salt wells, responsible for the salinity problems in the
lower Rio Grande and lower Colorado rivers respectively, have
proven to be merely temporary in nature.' 0 ' Farming in the
Mexicali Valley has been severely stifled due to the high alkaline
content of the Colorado River waters. 10 An additional danger to
the quality of the Colorado River is the Central Arizona Project
which will further degrade the water quality due to agricultural
runoff and reuse of the water supply before it reaches the Mexican
border. The problems stemming from the Central Arizona Project
are representative of the situations that are evolving in the other
drainage basins. Because of continuing development within the
one year the talks between the U.S. and Mexico over the resolution of the salin-
ity problem of the Colorado and Rio Grande rivers]; Meyers & Noble, The
Colorado River: The Treaty with Mexico, 19 STAN. L. REV. 367 (1967).
100. This position is evidenced by the lack of agreement to date over the
salinity problem and Mexico's past interpretation of the intention of the Treaty of
1944. See, e.g., notes 68, 69 supra. See also R. BERKAM AND K. ViscusI,
DAMNING THE WEST: THE NADER TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION 45 (1971), in which it is stated that Mexico will accept a salinity
agreement with the U.S. specifying that the U.S. must deliver Colorado River
water having a salinity content of not more than 1300 ppm or of a salinity level
equal to that of the Colorado River prior to the opening of the Welton-Mowhawk
drain into the Colorado River in 1961.
101. The talks between the U.S. and Mexico over the salinity problem attest
to its continuing and increasingly severe nature. Recent studies have shown that
the total dissolved solids in the Colorado River at Calexico-Mexicali are 851
mg/1 and sulfates 371 mg/I, the maximum acceptable standards established by
the U.S. Public Health Service being 500 mg/1 for total dissolved solids and
250 mg/1 for sulfates. The Rio Grande River at Brownsville, Texas, has meas-
urements, according to the same report, of 1070 mg/1 of total dissolved solids
and 307 mg/I of sulfates. U.S. DEP'T OF H.E.W., U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE,
INVENTORY OF WATER AND WASTEWATER FACILITIES, U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 39-48
(1971).
102. One reason for the high alkaline content of the Colorado River waters
is the lack of a salinity standard by which regulation of the salinity might be
accomplished. To date, there are no numerical salinity standards set by any of
the Colorado basin states in the U.S. However, on Feb. 15-17, 1972, a confer-
ence was held in Las Vegas, Nevada, in which the Colorado basin states offi-
cially appointed the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation to establish a salinity control
program with the assistance of the EPA. Telephone interview with Robert E.
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basins, the diminished water supplies are undergoing increased
use creating a proportionately higher degree of water pollution.
It is evident from a recent report compiled by the United
States and Mexico studying the municipal water and waste treat-
ment systems along the border that the principal Mexican cities
situated on the Rio Grande have less efficient waste treatment
facilities and add more untreated effluent to the river waters than
their smaller "sister" cities on the United States side of the riv-
er.103 It is also apparent in the report that there is a lack of
cooperation between the sister municipalities along the Rio
Grande in dealing with waste disposal and water quality main-
tenance.
Lack of a coordinated effort has been reflected in develop-
ment of the Tijuana River basin.10 4  One of the most glaring ex-
amples of the problem to date has been the misguided and hap-
hazard manner in which flood control measures have been initi-
ated in the basin.' 05 United States efforts on the flood control
project have been stalled periodically by environmentalist pres-
sures (utilizing the NEPA) and concern for maintenance of a
natural salt water estuary at the mouth of the Tijuana River. 0
Mexico has proceeded on an advanced schedule due to its desire
to use the river waters for irrigation as well as to alleviate the
threat of floods for land development.' 0 7  Thus, in the event of
extensive rains, the controlled flood waters in Mexico would be
forced across the border onto the unprotected United States farm
lands where the increased flow would wreak havoc far in excess
of normal flood conditions.
The three basins, it may be concluded, have problems that
are the result of uncoordinated, inefficient, and environmentally
blind water usage (quality) projects and regulations. Further-
103. U.S. DEP'T OF H.E.W., supra note 101 passim.
104. See CALIFORNIA SENATE, JOINT COMMITTEE ON WATER PROBLEMS,
FIFTH PARTIAL REPORT ON WATER PROBLEMS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA:
ALLOCATION OF THE WATERS OF THE TIJUANA RIVER UNDER THE TREATY BE-
TWEEN UNITED STATES AND MEXICO OF 1944 (Sacramento, May, 1953).
105. The flood control project was authorized by Congress in the Act of Oct.
6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-640, 80 Stat. 25. For descriptions of the problems
caused by the cost, binding agreements, and separate programs controlled by sep-
arate governments, see S.D. Union, Nov. 23, 1971, at B-I, col. 8; S.D. Union,
Dec. 5, 1971, at B-1. col. 7.
106. See S.D. Union, Nov. 23, 1971, at B-I, col. 8.
107. See, e.g., articles cited in notes 105, 106 supra.
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more, the Treaty of 1944 and the applicable domestic water qual-
ity provisions have proven to be deficient in many ways. 108 It
seems apparent that equitable usage and pollution control of the
water supply for the U.S.-Mexican border area cannot be effec-
tively applied until such deficiencies are alleviated. 109
V. CONCLUSION
The United States and Mexican governments must officially
recognize the geographic unity of an international drainage basin
and the application to such basins of the principle of equitable
utilization in order to solve their present international water qual-
ity dilemma." 0  The two nations, after accepting the above con-
ditions, could establish an effective intergovernmental agency for
each basin, either within or separate from the IBWC. 1 1 Each
agency could supplement the IBWC by promulgating and enforc-
108. See remarks by Mexican Water Resources minister, Leandro Rovirosa
Wade, calling for more U.S. cooperation in cleaning up "the contaminated waters
that flow through both countries." S.D. Union, Mar. 13, 1972, at A-9, col. 1.
109. An effective analogy may be drawn at this point between the U.S. do-
mestic water quality programs and the provisions for water quality control effect-
ing the rivers that the U.S. and Mexico share. There is a recognized need for
federal control of water quality in the U.S.; to implement a program on only a
state by state basis ignores the interstate characteristics of the resource and
the need for comprehensive planning involving all riparians affected. Thus,
just as an efficient interstate water quality control program cannot be administered
on a state by state level, so must an effective international water quality pro-
gram be based on more than mere national domestic laws. See note 104 supra;
C.E.Q., ANN. REP. (1970); J. BRECHER & M. NESTLE, supra note 10, at 56-7;
and note E.P.A. objectives as revealed to the House Public Works Committee on
June 17, 1971: (1) Federal water quality standards for all states. (2) Regula-
tions for establishing effluent standards by Jan. 1972. (3) State adoption of
effluent regulations by June 1972. (4) Operational monitoring system for as-
suring compliance with all water quality standards by Jan. 1976. BNA ENVIRON.
REP., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS (June 25, 1971) at 209.
110. Three factors exist at the present time that indicate unofficial recogni-
tion by the U.S. of the predominance of the equitable utilization principle:
(1) The U.S. position taken with Canada on the use of the Columbia River
waters. W.L. GRIFFIN, supra note 45; Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 332.
(2) Willingness of the U.S. to undertake solutions to the salinity problem
rather than submit to arbitration. Treaty Hearings, supra note 31, at 1751;
Meyers & Noble, supra note 99, at 409-10; Press Release, supra note 99.
(3) Statements by State Dep't officials in favor of equitable utilization.
Treaty Hearings, supra note 31, at 1747-1751; W.L. GRIFFIN, supra note 45.
111. For proposed establishment and delineation of powers and duties of a
river basin agency, see Roberts, supra note 24; and note the establishment of a
Joint Water Quality Board within the framework of the International Joint Com-
mission regulating the use of waters between the U.S. and Canada. BNA, EN-
VIRON. REP., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS (Aug. 27, 1971) at 504.
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ing water quality standards on a drainage basin level while the
commission carries out the logistics of the water quality projects.
In addition, the agencies could utilize the use priorities, cost pro-
visions and work allocations established in the 1944 Treaty.
Each basin agency could also develop and apply new systems
by which water pollution would be regulated domestically through
charging (taxing) and similar financial "incentives." ' 1 2  Such
financial provisions might also establish funds for technologically
advanced water quality control facilities. The incentives could
finance basin water quality control studies which would deter-
mine environmentally "safe" systems for water usage and alloca-
tion." 3  On the judicial level, separate and independent bodies
of the basin agencies could serve as suitably enlightened tribu-
nals to render intelligent decisions based on the geographical,
technological, social, and environmental factors involved in water
disputes." 4  The basin agencies would provide for the realistic
control of international drainage basin water quality and would
serve as examples for possible future multinational environmen-
tal agencies.
Charles R. Johnston, Jr.
112. For a discussion of domestic financial charging and incentive systems
see J. BRECHER & M. NESTLE, supra note 10, at 47-58.
113. See U.S. DEP'T OF INT., OFFICE OF SALINE WATER, SALINE WATER
CONVERSION REPORT at iii (1970-71), "[D]esalting is feasible now and commer-
cially available for municipal and industrial use in plants up to 10 million gallons
per day ...... The cost of conversion of brackish waters, i.e. Colorado and Rio
Grande rivers, according to the report at iii, can be as low as thirty-five cents per
1,000 gallons. Page 19 of the report indicates that the U.S./Mexico/I.A.E.A.
study team has concluded that dual purpose nuclear power and desalting plants
are entirely feasible and could provide the southwest U.S. and northwest Mexico
with required quantities of water, but that further studies have been slowed due
to lack of funding.
114. Membership of such tribunals could be made up of EPA regional offi-
cials and Secretariat de Recursos Hydraulicos officials,
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